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THE GUILTY MIND
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Abstract. The doctrine of mens rea can be expressed in this way: MRP: If A is culpable 
for performing φ, then A performs φ intentionally in circumstances in which it is 
impermissible to perform φ. The Sermon on the Mount suggests the following principle: 
SMP: If A intends to perform φ in circumstances in which it would be impermissible for 
A to perform φ, then A’s intending to perform φ makes A as culpable as A would be were 
A to perform φ. MRP and SMP are principles representative of intentionalism, a family 
of views that emphasizes the importance of intention to judgments about culpability. This 
essay examines an intentionalist’s defense of MRP with respect to lying, strict criminal 
liability, and the distinction between intention and foreseeability, along with a defense of 
SMP with respect to failed attempts, and self-defense.
Consider two passages that are the focus of this paper.
When Jesus, in the Sermon on the Mount, turns his attention to the 
commandment against adultery, he amplifies it by saying that “everyone 
who looks at a woman with lust has already committed adultery with her 
in his heart” (Matt. 5:28).
It is a time-honored principle in the criminal law that actus non facit 
reum nisi mens sit rea, an act does not make [its agent] guilty unless the 
mind be guilty. Call this the mens rea principle.
Suppose one interprets “with lust” in Jesus’ pronouncement as signal-
ing the presence of an intention to commit adultery. Then, even if the 
lustful agent were never to act on the intention (for lack of opportunity, 
say), he would not escape a charge of guilt; he would have a guilty mind. 
Suppose further that Jesus’ pronouncement generalizes, that for any kind 
of wrongdoing, φ, to intend to φ is already to do something for which 
one is culpable. Intention can be sufficient for culpability.
According to the mens rea principle, a person is not legally liable for 
her action if she did not intend to do what she did. (Cases of criminal 
negligence and reckless behavior provide counterexamples to the principle. 
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No harm will be done, however, if we set them aside.) The mens rea 
principle has its roots in common-sense morality. Your believing that I 
trod clumsily but accidentally on your sore foot would provoke one set of 
reactions; your believing that I did it intentionally, quite another. Intention 
can be necessary for culpability.
Together, then, the Sermon on the Mount and the mens rea principle 
make a strong case for the importance of intention to judgments of 
culpability. But importance comes in degrees, as do notions of intention. 
As a result there can be different versions of intentionalism, a family of 
views that lays stress on the significance of intention in assessments of 
culpability. In what follows I shall present a robust version of intention-
alism championed by a philosopher, let us call him Aurel, who takes 
both the mens rea principle and the Sermon on the Mount seriously. A 
few preliminary remarks are in order to describe the general contours of 
Aurel’s position.
Sometimes to say that a person acted intentionally is to say nothing 
more than that she did not act accidentally.1 Aurel’s notion of acting 
intentionally is more robust than that. To act intentionally is to act as the 
result of a deliberative exercise that takes beliefs and desires as inputs and 
yields a decision as output. Thus Aurel’s conception of acting intention-
ally supports the following conditional concerning intending to φ: If A 
intends to φ then A will φ if the opportunity arises.2 Aurel is willing to 
concede that phenomenologically the decision-making exercise can seem 
to the agent to take place instantaneously. What is important to him is a 
kind of logical, not temporal, priority, namely, that the analysis of acting 
intentionally requires specification of beliefs and desires. For this reason, 
if we suppose that to act willingly or voluntarily is simply to do what 
one wants to be doing, Aurel distinguishes acting willingly from acting 
intentionally. Many actions are performed both willingly and intentionally, 
but not all are. I surrender my wallet to the mugger intentionally but 
not willingly. The nicotine-depleted smoker might light up willingly but 
nonetheless “absent-mindedly.”
1 Cf. T. M. Scanlon, “Intention and Permissibility,” The Aristotelian Society, Supple-
mentary Volume 74 (2000): 306.
2 Further refinement of the conditional would build in a requirement that A believe 
that the opportunity is not immensely unlikely. I cannot seriously intend to win the 
Powerball lottery.
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With this understanding of intention as resolving-to-do-should-
opportunity-arise, Aurel understands the mens rea principle and Matthew 
5:28 (generalized) in the following ways, respectively,
MRP If A is culpable for performing φ, then A performs φ intention-
ally in circumstances in which it is impermissible to perform φ.
SMP If A intends to perform φ in circumstances in which it would 
be impermissible for A to perform φ, then A’s intending to perform 
φ makes A as culpable as A would be were A to perform φ.
Aurel takes MRP and SMP to be principles concerning the appraisal of 
an agent’s performance, not a principle about the rightness or wrongness 
of actions performed. The two principles are silent about what makes it 
impermissible for A to perform φ. If it helps, you can imagine that acts 
are impermissible if they fail to maximize happiness, or are not validated 
by the Categorical Imperative. Aurel is apt to favor the view that acts are 
impermissible if they contravene a divine command, but that is a topic 
for another paper.
In order to get a full sense of the robustness of Aurel’s intentionalism, 
we need to see how he uses it to criticize moral and legal practices that 
deviate from adherence to MRP and SMP. In what follows I present 
three kinds of case that test Aurel’s allegiance to MRP, namely, Lying, 
Strict Criminal Liability, and Intention and Foreseeability. I will then 
present two kinds of case to which SMP has application.
Lying
The first test for Aurel’s intentionalism is provided by the phenomenon 
of lying. When asked to say what a lie is, most people will agree that a 
lie is a false statement that the speaker believes to be false. Both condi-
tions seem necessary. In telling you the truth that St. Paul is the capital 
of Minnesota I have not lied to you even if I believe that Minnesota’s 
capital is Minneapolis. And if I sincerely tell you that Brasilia is the 
capital of Brazil, when in fact Brazil’s capital is São Paulo, although I 
might misinform you, I have not lied. Further reflection will lead many 
people to think that the two conditions are not sufficient. That is, there 
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are cases in which A tells B something that is false and that A believes 
to be false, but in which A has not thereby lied to B. Examples: A tells B 
a joke — “So, space aliens abducted Dick Cheney last week . . .”; A recites 
the line, “O, what a rogue and peasant slave am I!” while auditioning for 
a production of Hamlet. What these cases suggest is a third condition, 
something to the effect that a lie has to be told in a context in which 
truth-telling is the norm (and clearly the telling of jokes and the reciting 
of scripts are not such contexts).
Aurel is happy enough to accept these three conditions, but, given his 
intentionalism, he does not regard them as jointly sufficient. Consider 
the following cases:
Devotion: Francesca protests Paolo’s innocence to Paolo’s brother and 
her husband, Gianciotto. In fact, Francesca has been sleeping with Paolo. 
Moreover, Francesca knows that Gianciotto knows about the couple’s 
infidelity; thus that her protestation does not fool Gianciotto as to the 
facts. The context of the announcement is a context in which truth-telling 
is the norm. The point of Francesca’s protestation is to give Paolo enough 
time to escape.
Not Guilty: Grimesby pleads Not Guilty at his arraignment before 
the judge, even though Grimesby knows that he committed the crime. 
Because his participation in the crime was recorded on videotape that 
has been aired repeatedly on the local television stations, Grimesby does 
not imagine that the judge or anyone else in the court believes that he is 
not guilty. He simply takes his plea to be a step necessary to obtaining 
a trial.
By Aurel’s lights neither Francesca nor Grimesby has lied. Why not? 
Because neither had an intention to deceive anyone. According to Aurel, 
a fourth condition necessary to pin down the notion of lying is that the 
speaker must intend to deceive at least some members of the audience 
by means of what the speaker has said.3 Now Aurel’s addition will not be 
allowed to pass muster without an inspection. Some might try to handle 
Devotion and Not Guilty without the addition, either by claiming that 
a lie has been made, irrespective of the agent’s intention, or by claiming 
that the context of utterance is not a context governed by a norm of 
3 For a recent endorsement of this condition, see Bernard Williams, Truth and 
Truthfulness: An Essay in Genealogy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), 96.
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truth-telling. The latter tactic might be deployed with regard to Not 
Guilty. “A judicial arraignment,” a critic might allege, “is just not a setting 
in which one expects a defendant to speak the truth. Grimesby’s plea is 
not a declaration having a truth value. It is more like a password that 
he must utter to proceed to the next stage of the legal process.” Notice 
that Aurel can agree that arraignments are exceptions to the assumption 
of truth-telling. But he need not agree. Is the critic making an empirical 
observation about people’s attitudes towards arraignments? Or is the 
critic’s claim rather that there is something constitutive about arraign-
ments that exempts them from the norm? And what will the critic say of 
the case of the defendant who pleads Guilty? These are questions for the 
critic to answer, not Aurel. For all that the critic has said, Aurel can and 
does maintain that whether or not arraignments presuppose truth-telling, 
Grimesby has not lied, because he lacked an intention to deceive.
The critic’s tactic is less plausible in Devotion. There is a norm of 
truth-telling when the audience is one’s spouse. So let us consider a critic 
who says that contrary to Aurel’s claim, Francesca lied. This critic says: 
“I grant you that Francesca’s primary aim was to buy time for Paolo, but 
her means of doing that consisted in telling a lie, directly about Paolo and 
indirectly about her own involvement with Paolo. The context presup-
posed truthfulness, and Francesca exploited that presupposition in her 
utterances.” Aurel can acquiesce in much of what the critic says, except, 
of course, for the assertion that Francesca lied. To be sure, depending on 
how we embellish the story, it might be that Francesca’s protestation is in 
service of a grander plot to assassinate Gianciotto. There is nothing amiss 
about inquiring skeptically into Francesca’s motivation. But, Aurel will 
insist, it is one thing to impute a base motive to an action, and another 
thing to classify an action as a lie. It is tempting to make the inference 
from “basely motivated linguistic performance” to “lie.” We should resist 
the temptation.
Aurel supposes, then, that Devotion and Not Guilty, properly un-
derstood, count in favor of requiring an intent to deceive clause in the 
characterization of a lie. But might there not be other cases of verbal 
actions in which it is undeniable that the agent lied even though the agent 
had no intention to deceive? Thomas Carson has designed two such cases 
to show that the intent to deceive condition is not essential to lying. Let 
us call the first one Craven Witness:
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Suppose that I witness a crime and clearly see that a particular individual 
committed the crime. Later, the same person is accused of the crime and, as 
a witness in court, I am asked whether or not I saw the defendant commit 
the crime. I make the false statement that I did not see the defendant commit 
the crime, for fear of being harmed or killed by him. It does not necessarily 
follow that I intend that my false statements deceive anyone. (I might hope 
that no one believes my testimony and that he is convicted in spite of it.) 
Deceiving the jury is not a means to preserving my life. Giving false testimony 
is necessary to save my life, but deceiving others is not; the deception is merely 
an unintended “side effect.” I do not intend to deceive the jury in this case, 
but it seems clear that my false testimony would constitute a lie.4
The second one we can call Cheating Student:
Suppose that a college Dean is cowed whenever he fears that someone might 
threaten a law suit and has a firm, but unofficial, policy of never upholding 
a professor’s charge that a student cheated on an exam unless the student 
confesses in writing to having cheated. The Dean is very cynical about this 
and believes that students are guilty whenever they are charged. A student 
is caught in the act of cheating on an exam by copying from a crib sheet. 
The professor fails the student for the course and the student appeals the 
professor’s decision to the Dean who has the ultimate authority to assign the 
grade. The student is privy to information about the Dean’s de facto policy and, 
when called before the Dean, he (the student) affirms that he didn’t cheat on 
the exam. . . . The student says this on the record in an official proceeding and 
thereby warrants the truth of statements he knows to be false. He intends 
to avoid punishment by doing this. He may have no intention of deceiving 
the Dean that he didn’t cheat.5
Consider first Craven Witness. Carson claims that the lying witness 
does not intend to deceive the jury. That is not enough to show that 
intent to deceive is inessential to lying. Suppose that Riff and Bernardo 
are on their way to the local numbers parlor to lay down a few illegal 
bets. They are accosted by Officer Krupke, who wants to know what they 
are doing. Riff tells Krupke that he and Bernardo are going to church. 
Riff lies, intending to deceive Krupke, not Bernardo. It is no part of a 
plausible intent to deceive condition that one must intend to deceive 
4 Thomas L. Carson, “The Definition of Lying,” Noûs 40 (2006): 289.
5 Carson, „The Definition of Lying“, 290.
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every member of one’s audience. From the way in which Craven Witness 
is described, it appears that there is at least one person who the witness 
intends to deceive about what he saw, namely, the defendant. Let us 
make it explicit, then, on Carson’s behalf, that the witness knows that 
the defendant knows that the witness saw the defendant commit the 
crime. Aurel can still demur from the claim that the witness does not 
intend to deceive the jury, by invoking the distinction between acting 
intentionally and acting willingly. Aurel can claim that it is more accurate 
to say that the witness does not willingly deceive the jury, but does so, 
nonetheless, intentionally.
Now on to Cheating Student. Carson claims about this case both 
that the student lies and that the student has no intention to deceive 
anyone. But notice the context in which the case is embedded. The student 
began a project of deception when he cheated on the exam, a project in 
service of the goal of getting a higher grade. He could have terminated 
the project by not appealing his professor’s decision to the Dean. Aurel 
agrees that the student’s warranted statement is a lie, but insists that it 
is intended to deceive, by furthering the deceptive project that began 
with the cheating. We can call the principle to which Aurel appeals the 
Furtherance of Deception Principle:
FDP If a statement is made with the intention to further a project of decep-
tion, then the statement is made with the intention to deceive.
Note that “the intention to deceive” in the consequent of FDP need 
not be an intention regarding the content of the statement picked out 
in FDP’s antecedent. A true statement can satisfy FDP: deception 
need not confine itself to the false. It might be that A’s long-range 
intention is to lie to B about some sordid episode in A’s past. In order 
to gain B’s trust, and thus to set B up for accepting the falsehood, A 
reveals to B a whole series of truths about A’s past. The true revelations 
that A thus makes qualify under FDP as statements made with the 
intention to deceive. Of course the intention to deceive in the case of 
the true revelations is not directed at the content of A’s statements. 
Here it is instructive to compare Aurel with Bernard Williams. When 
Williams defines the notion of a lie, he says that it is “an assertion, 
the content of which the speaker believes to be false, which is made 
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with the intention to deceive the hearer with regard to that content.”6 
Let us adopt Williams’s idiom, but add the requirements that the 
speaker’s assertion must be false and be made in a context in which 
truth-telling is the norm. Finally, let us blend in the upshot of FDP. 
Aurel can then say that
LIE A lie is an assertion made in a context in which truth-telling is the 
norm, whose content is false, which the speaker believes to be false, and 
which the speaker makes with the intention either to deceive at least one of 
the hearers with regard to that content or to further a project of deception 
undertaken by the speaker.
According to Carson, Cheating Student is a case of lying without intent 
to deceive. By Aurel’s lights, intentional deception is still implicated 
essentially. I suggest that, at a minimum, LIE is a serious contender 
for an adequate definition of lying. Given the prominent role that it 
assigns to intention, LIE allows for the creation of a special case of 
MRP:
MRP: Lie If A is culpable for lying, then A makes an assertion in a context 
in which truth-telling is the norm, whose content is false, which A believes 
to be false, and which A makes with the intention either to deceive at least 
one of the hearers with regard to that content or to further a project of 
deception undertaken by A, in circumstances in which it is impermissible 
for A to make the assertion.
Finally, we should note that LIE is an attempt to depict what a lie is. It 
is aimed at determining whether a person in a particular situation has 
lied. LIE is silent on the normative question raised by the last clause 
of MRP: Lie, namely, under what circumstances lying is impermissible. 
It is open to Aurel, for example, to take the hard line that there are no 
circumstances in which lying is permissible. But for now let us leave 
him content to argue for the correctness of LIE and MRP: Lie.
6 Williams, Truth and Truthfulness, 96.
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Strict Criminal Liability
Imagine the following scenario: Perry the lawyer has been approached 
by Cheatley, who wants Perry to defend him against a charge of murder. 
“Who is the victim?” Perry asks.
“Somebody named Vicky. I forget her last name; I never met her.”
“Then how did you kill — let me rephrase that — how is it that Vicky 
met her demise?”
“It began when she opened a mailing I sent…”
“Oh, dear, a letter bomb. Courts take a dim view of people who send 
letter bombs. We’d better go for an insanity defense.”
“No, that’s not what happened at all. Vicky was an agent for the 
Internal Revenue Service. When she opened my tax return, she realized 
quickly that it was fraudulent. That realization gave her a fatal heart attack. 
So I’ve been charged with her murder.”
The scenario is not as farfetched as one might imagine. First, filing a 
fraudulent tax return is a felony. So Cheatley was engaged in felonious 
activity when he filed his return. Second, Cheatley’s filing the return 
brought about Vicky’s death: had he not filed the return, she would not 
have had her heart attack.7 Were Perry to take the case, he would argue 
that there is a huge gap between intending to defraud the government 
and intending to kill an IRS agent, claiming truthfully that Cheatley 
did harbor the first intention but not the second, and further, that had 
Cheatley known that his fraud would result in someone’s death, he would 
have abandoned his intention to defraud.
Depending on the venue in which the case is to be tried, Perry will 
find his argument facing greater or less resistance. Many states in the 
United States have felony-murder laws, laws which maintain that if some-
one is killed in the course of an attempt to commit a felony or to flee 
from a felony, all accomplices to the felony can be charged with murder. 
Felony-murder laws are the most dramatic members of a class of strict 
criminal liability laws, items of legislation that criminalize certain kinds 
of behavior in certain circumstances irrespective of the agent’s inten-
tions. In both wording and precedent, different states apply the notion 
7 I do not believe that the truth of the counterfactual conditional is sufficient to 
impute causal agency. Holding all other factors constant, Vicky might have had her heart 
attack whether or not Cheatley filed his fraudulent return.
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of a felony-murder differently. But would any state sustain a conviction 
of Cheatley on charges of first-degree homicide?
Probably not. But there are actual cases that come surprisingly — some 
would say disturbingly — close to Cheatley’s. In People v. Hickman8 the 
Illinois Supreme Court upheld a lower court’s finding that the defendant 
was guilty of murder as a result of an unsuccessful burglary attempt at 
a liquor warehouse. The police had the warehouse under surveillance 
at night. As Hickman and two accomplices exited the warehouse, the 
police closed in. The three burglars fled. In the ensuing confusion one 
police officer mistook an armed police detective for one of the burglars. 
The officer shot the detective, killing him. There was no evidence that 
Hickman was armed before, during, or after the burglary. It does not 
take excessive charity to suppose that had Hickman believed that his 
burglary would lead to someone’s death, he would have abandoned 
the burglary. The relevant part of Illinois’s felony-murder statute states 
that “(a) A person who kills an individual without lawful justification 
commits murder if, in performing the acts which cause the death … (3) 
[h]e is attempting or committing a forcible felony other than voluntary 
manslaughter.”9 One might be surprised to learn that Illinois regards 
burglary as a “forcible felony,” especially when compared to burglary’s 
more violent sibling, armed robbery. But surely even under Illinois’s 
expansive conception of a forcible felony, fraudulent tax filing does not 
qualify. Nonetheless, People v. Hickman suggests that People v. Cheatley 
might be closer to legal reality than we had hitherto expected.
It is easy to anticipate some of Aurel’s reaction to strict criminal li-
ability laws in general and felony-murder laws in particular. Strict liability 
laws flout the mens rea principle by dispensing with the intentionality 
requirement. Felony-murder legislation abuses the well-entrenched notion 
of murder by promoting some palpably unintentional homicides to the 
rank of first-degree homicides. Aurel campaigns for a conception of 
murder that respects the mens rea principle:
8 59 Ill. 2d 89 (1974). Another salient case is People v. Fuller, 89 Cal. App. 3d 618 
(1978).
9 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 38, sec. 9–1(a)(3).
51the guilty mind
MRP: Murder If A is culpable for murder, then A kills some person in-
tentionally in circumstances in which it is impermissible for A to kill that 
person.
There is more to be said than this. For an intentionalist like Aurel, 
felony-murder laws cry out for justification. So let us imagine a defender 
of their propriety offering the following rationale:
“The defense I offer is a defense that is relative to the basic legal 
structure of a society. Different civil societies exhibit different patterns 
of response to behavior they regard as criminal. These patterns typically 
embody any number of historical accidents. Once embodied, the patterns 
take on a life of their own. Entrenchment can set in, in the name of 
evenhandedness and predictability; think of the importance attached to 
stare decisis. Working against universal entrenchment are social pressures to 
dislodge legally ensconced practices now believed to be wrong. The result 
is that any human society’s system of criminal law is apt to be a medley 
of vagariously assembled doctrines. Otto von Bismarck is supposed to 
have said: ‘Laws are like sausages. It is better not to see them being made.’ 
The point is that like sausages, human laws are made by human beings 
with all their foibles.
“Yet all these different patterns are recognizable attempts to provide 
security for citizens by punishing behavior that threatens their safety. 
As such, much of the criminal law is directed against behavior that we 
all regard as seriously morally wrong. But sometimes legislators find 
themselves having to achieve a balance among competing goals, each 
of which has warrant. For example, American jurisdictions place a high 
premium on the presumption of innocence in criminal proceedings. 
The presumption places the burden of proof on the prosecution and, in 
criminal cases, the standard of proof is high, ‘beyond a reasonable doubt.’ 
Adherence to the presumption of innocence results in an asymmetrical, 
adversarial trial dynamic, in which the prosecution’s efforts are aimed 
at proving guilt while the defense’s task is to induce reasonable doubt, 
chiefly by rebutting parts of the prosecution’s evidence. Subscription 
to the presumption of innocence is optional: some other countries 
that have criminal judicial systems equally as just as the American 
system do not follow the principle or its attendant adversarial trial 
structure so assiduously. Although the presumption is optional, to 
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say this is not to say that it is capricious, misguided, or wrong. At 
tension with the presumption of innocence is the goal of public safety: 
Americans understandably want to keep the number of violent crimes 
at a minimum. An ideal system of criminal justice would be one that 
infallibly identified the intentions and motives of every defendant 
brought before it. But for obvious reasons that is humanly impossible. 
Humans don’t have the time, the resources, or the expertise that would 
be required to search the souls of people. Yet that is what American 
prosecutors would seem to have to do, following the presumption of 
innocence, namely, prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
had the requisite mens rea.
“What courts can do is assess behavior and other kinds of publicly 
accessible evidence. Some types of behavior are dangerous to others. 
In order to strike some sort of balance between public safety and the 
presumption of innocence, a legislature can adopt the policy that if a 
kind of behavior is felonious, can be shown to have been undertaken 
intentionally, and results in the death of another, then it is permissible 
to tax the agent of the behavior with a penalty that is the penalty he 
would have incurred had he unambiguously intended the other’s death. 
The legislature need not be construed as adopting the patent fiction 
that the agent intended the death.10 It can be viewed as declaring 
instead that the consequences of the agent’s actions have exposed 
him to the same penalty he would have faced had he directly killed 
the other person.
“Felony-murder laws thus have two deterrent virtues. First, they 
discourage the commission of certain kinds of felonies by raising 
the stakes. They put would-be felons on notice that if things go 
10 Here is a sampling of some dubious legal fictions.
(F1) Whoever intends φ also intends all the consequences of φ.
(F2) Whoever intends φ, knowing that φ is wrong (or illegal, take your pick), intends all 
the bad consequences of φ.
(F3) Whoever intends φ, knowing that φ is wrong (etc.), intends all the bad foreseeable 
consequences of φ.
(F1) and (F2) are enough to impale Hickman; maybe (F3), too — it all depends on how 
much is packed into the notion of foreseeability. (Some consequences are more foreseeable 
than others. Cheatley cannot have been expected to have foreseen that his fraudulent tax 
return would bring about a heart attack, but maybe Hickman should have realized that 
his burglary would run the risk of someone’s dying.)
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awry with their felonious activity, they may find themselves facing 
the most serious penalties one can face. Second, they undercut the 
advantage the would-be felon might have thought he would have 
with the presumption of innocence. In cases of homicide to which 
felony-murder laws apply, prosecution no longer has the burden of 
proving the defendant’s mens rea.
“I wish to emphasize that this defense of the legitimacy of felony-
murder laws is provisional and contingent. Provisional, because it depends 
on empirical claims to the effect that felony-murder laws further the goal 
of public security by deterring people from certain kinds of crime. If those 
claims are false then the defense is punctured. Contingent, because there 
are different legal systems that get along fine without felony-murder laws. 
One cannot claim that they are necessarily woven into the fabric of an 
ideal legal structure. (The United Kingdom abolished them in 1957 and 
hasn’t slid into chaos as a result.) Do they violate MRP: Murder? It is 
clear that they allow for the possibility that people can be held legally 
culpable for murder even when they are not morally culpable. But the 
boundaries of the province of legal culpability are drawn by a society’s 
legislature: they are no more grounded in the nature of things than is the 
boundary between Minnesota and Ontario.”
By now one might be excused for wondering how Aurel will react to 
this defense. The answer is simple. The defense is Aurel’s. All that Aurel 
needs to do is to add two sentences to it: “In contrast, MRP: Murder is 
not a matter of convention. Its conditions on culpability for murder are not 
subject to human legislation and thus cannot vary from one jurisdiction 
to another.” Note that, as was the case with MRP: Lie, MRP: Murder 
does not pronounce on what kinds of intentional homicides, if any, are 
permissible.
Intention and Foreseeability
Aurel’s intentionalism would be flawed if its emphasis on what the 
agent intends were to result in an unsupportable exaggeration of the 
difference between intended consequences and merely foreseen con-
sequences. Discussions of the role of intention in ethics frequently 
lead to discussions of the Doctrine of Double Effect, which in turn 
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frequently lead to a consideration of the distinction between intended 
and merely foreseen consequences. The doctrine is supposed to apply 
to choice situations in which the consequences are unavoidably mixed, 
some being good, some bad. The doctrine has received insightful and 
provocative attention recently in its application to choices made in 
medical ethics, in the conduct of combatants in war, and in how one 
should conduct oneself in an area plagued by distressingly many wayward 
trolleys.11 There are several ways of formulating the doctrine, not all of 
them obviously equivalent, but I shall assume that the following version 
is representative:
DDE If A’s performing φ would unavoidably have both good consequences, 
GC, and bad consequences, BC, then it is permissible for A to perform φ 
if and only if (1) φ itself is not morally forbidden, (2) A does not intend to 
bring about BC, (3) BC is not causally necessary for GC, and (4) the badness 
of BC does not outweigh the goodness of GC.
Illustration: In the course of prosecuting a formally declared war against 
Bulgia, the Commander in Chief of the armed forces of Ulceria has 
to decide whether to bomb Bulgia’s major munitions factory, thereby 
bringing the war to a speedier conclusion. The DDE tells the Commander 
that his action is permissible, even if the bombing results in loss of 
life of some noncombatant civilians, as long as the bombing itself is 
not a forbidden act, the Commander does not intend the death of the 
civilians, their death is not a causal means necessary for bringing about 
the speedier conclusion, and the good consequences of the speedier 
conclusion (say, in Bulgian and Ulcerian lives spared) is not outweighed 
by the bad consequences of the Bulgian civilian deaths.
Let us put pressure on clause (2) of DDE. Suppose that the 
Commander knows full well that bombing the munitions factory will 
kill several innocent noncombatants. (He knows this, we might suppose, 
because it is common knowledge that the Bulgians force kidnaped 
11 See Philippa Foot, “The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect,” 
Oxford Review 5 (1967): 5–15; Judith Jarvis Thomson, “The Trolley Problem,” Yale Law 
Journal 94 (1985); 1395–1415; F. M. Kamm, Morality, Mortality: Volume II: Rights, Duties, 
and Status (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996); and Scanlon, “Intention and 
Permissibility.”
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Ulcerian citizens to work in the factory.) Is it not facetious in this 
circumstance to maintain that although he foresees that they will be 
killed if he bombs the factory, he does not intend their death? How, in 
this circumstance, could foreseeing their death not just be intending their 
death, accompanied, perhaps, by some self-deception? And if it is not 
the same thing, how could the difference be significant enough so that 
intending their death would make the bombing impermissible whereas 
merely foreseeing their death would not?12 Put the question in the 
idiom of Aurel’s robust conception of intention: how can the decision to 
bomb, based in part on the true, justified belief that the noncombatants 
will be killed, not be a decision to kill the noncombatants?
It may be that the pressure on clause (2) is generated by the thought 
that known consequences are intended consequences:
KCIC If A intends to perform φ and knows that ψ is a consequence of A’s 
performing φ, then A also intends ψ.
If true, KCIC would deal a serious blow to DDE by collapsing the 
distinction between foreseeing a consequence and intending it. But 
KCIC does not appear to be true. Suppose that A can save the life 
of either B or C, but not both. Suppose further that A knows all the 
facts pertinent to her predicament. A lets a randomizing device, for 
example, a toss of a coin, determine whom she will save: heads, it is 
B; tails, C. Suppose the coin lands heads up. A now intends to save B, 
knowing that it follows that C must die. A does not intend that C die, 
even though she surely foresees that C’s death is a consequence of her 
intentionally saving B.
I do not claim to have vindicated clause (2), much less DDE, for there 
may be other considerations independent of KCIC that allow pressure to 
continue to be applied to (2), and there are other quarrels one might have 
with the other clauses. But I do want to point out that an intentionalist 
of Aurel’s stripe need not swear fealty to DDE, at least not in the way in 
which it is typically understood. Keeping with the spirit of MRP, Aurel 
can put forward something that looks like the Doctrine of Double Effect, 
but which nonetheless differs from it in significant ways:
12 Scanlon reports that a similar case was suggested to him by Judith Jarvis Thomson; 
see “Intention and Permissibility,” 304–305.
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MRP: Double Effect If A’s performing φ unavoidably had both good con-
sequences, GC, and bad consequences, BC, then A is culpable for performing 
φ if and only if either (1) φ itself was morally forbidden, or (2) A intended to 
bring about BC, or (3) BC was causally necessary for GC, or (4) the badness 
of BC outweighs the goodness of GC.
Clause (2) shows that MRP: Double Effect does not dissolve the 
problem of distinguishing between what is intended and what is 
merely foreseen. But MRP: Double Effect is not simply a De Morgan 
transformation of DDE, specifying a logically equivalent principle in 
terms of forbiddenness instead of permissibility. The notion highlighted 
by MRP: Double Effect is culpability, not forbiddenness. Recall that 
the original MRP was put forward as a principle of agent performance 
appraisal, not as a principle about what is forbidden, obligatory, or 
permissible. The latter sort of principle is insensitive to the time at 
which it is applied to a particular case. DDE, for example, can be 
invoked prospectively, as a guide to action, or retrospectively, as a vehicle 
of moral criticism of the action committed. MRP: Double Effect, in 
contrast, has only a retrospective function — hence its formulation is 
in the past tense — namely, the assessment of the agent’s performance 
after the fact. An omniscient judge could, one presumes, determine 
whether A merely foresaw or intended that BC would come about, 
but short of omniscience, MRP: Double Effect is no better off than 
DDE concerning the foreseen-intended distinction. Moreover, the fact 
that MRP: Double Effect is exclusively retrospective and exclusively 
agent-judgmental may seem to rob it of much of its interest.
In a while Aurel will have a chance to respond to this attempt at 
dismissal. For now, however, let us turn to cases relevant to principle SMP. 
So far we have looked at cases that attempt to belittle the importance 
of intention as a necessary condition for imputations of culpability. The 
next two cases, Failed Attempts, and Intentions and Motives, cast doubt 
on the sufficiency of a presence of intention for ascriptions of culpability, 
thus challenging principle SMP.
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Failed Attempts
Here are two alternative hypothetical cases, one a “success,” the other 
a “failure.”
Premeditation: Alpha has coolly planned in advance to kill Beta, 
believing with good reason that Beta would soon blow the whistle on 
Alpha’s embezzling activities. Alpha raises his rifle, takes careful aim, and 
dispatches Beta with one shot.
Mosquito: Same scenario, two different actors. As Gamma peers 
down the barrel of his rifle aimed at Delta and begins to squeeze the 
trigger, a mosquito lands on his nose, causing his shot to go astray.
In Premeditation Alpha is guilty of first-degree homicide, something 
for which Alpha would presently stand to face the death penalty in 
thirty-eight out of fifty states in the United States. In Mosquito Gamma 
is guilty of attempted murder, a felony, to be sure, but one that exposes 
Gamma to a much less severe penalty. Why the disparity? Alpha and 
Gamma have exactly the same evil intentions and motives. Gamma did 
everything he could to further his quest, just as Alpha did. Why should 
an adventitious mosquito make such a big legal difference?
Skeptics about the importance of intentions will say that the dispar-
ity indicates that we care more about results. How much more? As a 
statistical exercise, one might try to compute the average sentence meted 
out to defendants found guilty of first-degree homicide (arbitrarily 
assigning sixty years, say, to life sentences and to the death penalty), 
along with the average sentence imposed on defendants found guilty 
only of attempted homicide. The first average divided by the second 
would then give us the failed attempt discount index, or FADI, which 
could serve as a measure of the extent to which a particular jurisdiction 
discounts failed attempts compared to successful attempts. Thus if the 
jurisdiction hands out, on average, fifty-year sentences for first-degree 
homicides and five-year sentences for attempted homicides, its FADI is 
ten. One could then compare the FADIs among different jurisdictions 
to see whether interesting patterns emerge, and to gauge the strength 
of the skeptics’ case for demoting intentions.
As sociologically interesting as the construction of FADIs might 
be, they would merely quantify the practice; they would not justify 
it. The normative question remains: why should we follow a schedule 
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of legal punishment in which Gamma’s deed is treated more lightly 
than Alpha’s? One might naturally seek to give a justification for the 
disparity by appealing to consequences. But while it is true that Alpha’s 
act had worse consequences than Gamma’s, it is hard to find a plausible 
systematic rationale for punishing Gamma less severely among the 
familiar consequentialistic dimensions of general deterrence, particular 
deterrence, incapacitation (or social quarantine), rehabilitation, and 
education.13 Perhaps in recognition of the lack of justification, Section 
5.05 of the American Law Institute’s Model Penal Code recommends 
that
Except as otherwise provided in this Section, attempt, solicitation and con-
spiracy are crimes of the same grade and degree as the most serious offense 
which is attempted or solicited or is an object of the conspiracy. An attempt, 
solicitation or conspiracy to commit a [capital crime or a] felony of the first 
degree is a felony of the second degree.14
It appears that the recommendation is to treat attempted burglary as if 
it were burglary, attempted arson as if it were arson, and so on, with the 
exception of a capital crime or a felony of the first degree, which would 
surely encompass premeditated, intentional homicide. In this case, the 
failed attempt would be demoted to second-degree homicide, which 
would carry with it a lesser penalty.
By Aurel’s lights the Model Penal Code has almost got it right. If the 
various consequentialistic justifications for downgrading failed attempts 
are themselves unpersuasive, then there appears to be no provisional or 
contingent argument, akin to the rationale Aurel offered for felony-
murder laws, that justifies treating failed attempts less severely than 
successful attempts. In short, the FADI for any jurisdiction should be 
one, even for failed attempts at homicide. We can imagine Aurel saying, 
with rhetorical zeal, that Gamma is as guilty of murder as Alpha is, 
thereby giving a forceful rendition of the phrase “guilty for all intents 
13 For criticism of these sorts of attempts at justification, see David Lewis, “The 
Punishment That Leaves Something to Chance,” in Papers in Ethics and Social Philosophy 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 227–243.
14 American Law Institute, Model Penal Code (1962), as reprinted in Wayne R. LaFave, 
Modern Criminal Law: Cases, Comments and Questions (St. Paul: West Publishing Co., 
1978), 741 (brackets in original).
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and purposes.” The fact that Delta did not die because of Gamma’s effort 
is immaterial to the assessment of Gamma’s culpability. Aurel subscribes 
to a close relative of SMP:
SMP: Failed Evil Attempts If A attempts but fails to perform φ in circum-
stances in which it is impermissible for A to perform φ, then A’s attempting 
to perform φ makes A as culpable as A would have been had A succeeded 
in performing φ.15
It may have occurred to you by now that failure comes in at least two 
flavors. One can fail in the attempt to do something evil, but one can 
also fail in the attempt to do something good. Suppose that Alberta and 
Alberto individually intend to donate substantial amounts of money to a 
charity. For that purpose it happens that both of them entrust their money 
in accounts managed by Bezzle, the banker. Bezzle decides to drain one of 
the accounts and abscond with the funds. Bezzle flips a coin to determine 
which account to drain. It happens to be Alberto’s. As a consequence, 
Alberta’s money goes to the charity while Alberto’s money does not. If 
Alberta is praiseworthy then Alberto should be equally as praiseworthy. 
But Alberta’s existence in this case is, at bottom, irrelevant. It is Alberto 
who should be equally as praiseworthy whether or not he succeeds. The 
principle at work here is
SMP: Failed Good Attempts If A attempts but fails to perform φ in circum-
stances in which it is permissible for A to perform φ, then A’s attempting to 
perform φ makes A as praiseworthy as A would have been had A succeeded 
in performing φ.
Intentions and Motives: The Case of Self-Defense
Intentions are one thing, motives another. SMP ignores the importance 
of motives to the assessment of character (and thus may do an injustice 
to the interpretation of Matt. 5:28). We can examine the difference 
between intentions and motives by looking at the legal plea of self-defense. 
15 Here and below let us understand “A attempts to φ” to rule out “half-hearted” 
attempts.
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Criminal law relies on a set of purely external, formalistic criteria by 
which it gauges putative cases eligible for a plea of self-defense. Chief 
among these criteria are the following:
Imminence: The harm threatened by the attacker must be temporally 
immediate and unavoidable. B’s threat to attack A a week from next 
Tuesday does not justify A in attacking B today (unless, perhaps, A is 
already unjustly in B’s clutches). In the eyes of the law, a preemptive strike 
is not self-defense.
Proportionality: The harm inflicted by the intended victim must be 
just sufficient to thwart the attacker and must not exceed in any case the 
harm the attacker would have inflicted. If B’s proposed act of aggression 
is simply to mush a custard pie in A’s face, A cannot plead self-defense 
for gunning down B.
Reasonable Person Standard: The intended victim is expected to have 
assessed the situation and responded as a reasonable person would in the 
victim’s circumstances. A’s prospects for a successful plea of self-defense 
evaporate if it turns out that A believed B to be a space alien. (In this 
case, perhaps an insanity plea would be more successful.)
Consider now two hypothetical cases. In both of them the agent, 
fully aware of the eligibility criteria for a successful plea of self-defense, 
contrives to be the intended victim of an attack, using the attack as the 
occasion for killing the attacker.
Greed: Avaritia stands to inherit Luger Shortfuse’s considerable 
fortune. But Luger is young and fit, with prospects of living a long 
life. Obsessed with the prospects of wealth and knowing of Luger’s 
penchant for violence, Avaritia intentionally provokes him into attacking 
her with a poker. Avaritia puts to use Luger’s loaded pistol, which she 
had planted nearby, thereby quickly becoming a wealthy heiress.
Tender-heartedness: Mauser Shortfuse, Luger’s father, is suffering 
horribly from a terminal disease for which palliation is ineffective. 
Mauser wants to be put out of his misery but does not want his death 
to be counted as a suicide. Nor does he want his kin to be put at risk 
of a charge of murder, were they to exercise conventional modes of 
euthanasia. His daughter, Mercy, who knows all this and is moved by 
nothing other than compassion for her father, ruefully but determinedly 
exploits Mauser’s one family foible by goading Mauser into attacking 
her so that she can kill Mauser quickly.
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One can refine these cases so that Avaritia and Mercy both pass the 
tests for a successful plea of self-defense. And one can easily imagine 
someone who reasons in this fashion: “I would not care to live next 
door to the Shortfuse family. Even so, I would harbor less cold feelings 
for Mercy than for Avaritia. My differential response does not appear 
to be based on a difference in their intentions, for they both act from 
the same sort of intention — to kill a family member while making it 
look like self-defense. Nor is it based on the facts that Luger had no 
desire to die while Mauser did, and that Avaritia deprived Luger of 
a longer, happier future than the future denied to Mauser by Mercy. 
Perhaps not all intentional killings are forbidden — let’s set aside for 
another day a discussion about killing in warfare and legally sanctioned 
executions — but these two killings are forbidden. Nor can I detect 
more evil remote intentions in Avaritia. Her remote intention is to 
inherit, to which her intention to kill is a means, while Mercy’s remote 
intention is to alleviate suffering. There is nothing wrong with an 
intention to inherit per se. So I’m left to conclude that what explains 
my antipathy towards Avaritia is the presence of greed in her, which 
is not present in Mercy. Greed is not an intention; back in the old 
days it was numbered among the seven deadly sins, an acquired vice 
that disposes its possessor to seek after more material goods than is 
necessary or fitting. So when it comes to agent performance appraisal, 
SMP can’t be the whole story.”
Aurel can acknowledge that whether it is acquired voluntarily or 
not, greed is the sort of character trait that ought to be resisted or 
stifled, precisely because it disposes its possessor to form evil intentions. 
But whatever culpability one has for the possession of a vice, it pales 
in comparison to the culpability one has for intentionally exercising 
it. A vice is a bit like Luger’s loaded and unattended pistol — merely 
dangerous in itself but calamitous when used to evil purposes. The best 
way, perhaps the only way, to resist a vice like greed is the same way one 
tries to break any bad habit — by avoiding situations that encourage the 
exercise of the vice and by resolving not to acquiesce in the vice when 
the situations are unavoidable. One may not succeed, but there seems 
to be no other way of even trying. The principle that applies here, by 
Aurel’s lights, is this:
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SMP:Vice If A attempts but fails to avoid performing φ in circumstances 
in which it is impermissible for A to perform φ, because A’s vice-driven 
desire to perform φ overpowers his attempt to avoid performing φ, then 
A is less culpable than A would have been had A not (even) attempted to 
avoid performing φ.
Aurel also has a bone to pick with the formalistic criteria that help to 
define a successful plea of self-defense. That they can be manipulated, 
as in Greed and Tender-heartedness, is a symptom that they set the 
standard too low. More specifically, they are insensitive to the role that 
the agent’s intention plays in these cases. Even more specifically, they 
function as surrogates to intention: instead of attempting to assay what 
the agent intended, courts can simply apply the criteria, thus allowing 
Avaritia and Mercy to slip through the cracks undetected.
Aurel’s complaint here may strike one as unrealistically high-minded. 
We cannot read people’s minds. Courts must make decisions by ap-
plying objective tests to publicly observable behavior, resisting the 
temptation to construct invidious and unverifiable hypotheses about 
the agent’s intentions. Even if some sort of technology were developed 
that would allow authorities to eavesdrop on people’s thoughts, we 
would regard that development with horror. Aurel himself is deeply 
suspicious about the wisdom, justice, and continued stability of any 
political authority. He is thus inclined to agree that there are many 
instances of wrongdoing for which government intervention would be 
worse than allowing the wrongdoing to go undetected, unapprehended, 
and unpunished. What else can one hope for?
Confessions
When it comes to appraising the hidden springs behind a person’s 
publicly observable performance, one can hope for an authority who 
is omniscient, infallible and incorruptible, perfectly just and perfectly 
merciful, who will sort out and set right the injustices in the world. 
That is the direction in which Aurel has been steering us.16 And Aurel 
16 Note how MRP: Double Effect, even though exclusively retrospective, takes on 
importance from the point of view of a divine judge.
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is not a fictional character. I take myself to have been channeling, in 
contemporary idiom, the thought of Aurelius Augustinus, known more 
familiarly as St. Augustine, supplemented in some cases by insights from 
Peter Abelard, who, I am prepared to argue, knew Augustine’s moral 
thought very well.17 A champion of human-made law would do well 
to attend to their arguments, but need not fear usurpation of power: 
Aurel’s judge presides over a different jurisdiction.
17 For my more historical excursions in these fields, see “Inner-Life Ethics,” in The 
Augustinian Tradition, ed. Gareth B. Matthews (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1999), 140–165; “To Catch a Heretic: Augustine on Lying,” Faith and Philosoph 20 (2003), 
479–495; and “Ethics,” in The Cambridge Companion to Abelard, ed. Jeffrey Brower and 
Kevin Guilfoy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 279–304.
